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## Approved For Kelease 12007 to 2/08 cold - RDR 3201027 K000200020008-6

Washington, D. C. 20505

14 November 1980

MORI review(s) completed.

#### ALERT MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council

SUBJECT:

Attachment

Iran-Iraq and Danger of a Wider War

Recent attacks by Iranian aircraft on Kuwaiti border installations raise the possibility that Tehran is now prepared to widen the war in order to stop Arab aid to Iraq. I believe the greatest danger--should Iran continue this course of action--is the possibility that Kuwaiti or other Arab oil facilities will become targets for Iranian attacks.

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#### THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

Approved For Release

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14 November 1980

### ALERT MEMORANDUM\*

IRAN-IRAQ: Danger of a Wider War

The Iranian airstrikes near Kuwaiti border installations on 12 November and possibly 5 November have increased the danger of a wider war in the Persian Gulf. While it is not certain that these strikes were intended actually to hit targets within Kuwait, their purpose was clearly to intimidate the Kuwaitis. Tehran may now be willing to use selective military action against Kuwait and possibly other gulf states to discourage them from aiding Baghdad.

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Director of Community. aware of in implication development	Memorandum is an i Central Intellig Its purpose is t apending potential as for US interest ts will occur. Ih g level with CIA,	gence on behalf to ensure that s l developments t ts. It is not a his memorandum h	of the Intellige enior policymake hat may have ser prediction that as been coordina	nce rs are ious these
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	Approved For Kelease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83B01027K000200020008-6	
.∵ 25X1 <b>:</b>	If Tehran decides to widen the war by escalating its attacks on Kuwait or striking other gulf states, the United States could become more directly involved in the conflict. US allies in the region, including Saudi Arabia, would very likely request additional security assistance from the United States.	
25X1	There is also a danger that US forces in the area could be attackedeither deliberately or in errorby the Iranians. Tehran has already accused the United States of supplying intelligence collected by the AWACS aircraft to Iraq. Additionally, Iranian officials have reported that the US naval facility in Bahrain is along Baghdad. Tehran also believes that the United States has concluded a secret agreement with the United Arab Emirates requiring American assistance in the event of an Iranian attack.	25X1
	If the gulf Arabs ignore Tehran's warnings, Iran could launch further strikes, perhaps against oil installations. The Iranian Air Force retains a capability to do this all along the gulf littoral. Iran's more aggressive military attacks on Iraqi oil installations during the past week have already made the risk of another explosion in world oil prices much greater. Given the indefinite suspension of exports from both Iran and Iraq, the market has no further room to absorb even small additional interruption of supplies from the other gulf countries.	25X1
25X1	The Soviets are concerned that a wider war would lead to closer US cooperation with the area's conservative Arab states and an expanded US military presence. The Soviets probably would therefore give additional support to efforts already under way to end the conflict. Moscow would also likely renew its proposal for joint discussions on the security of international maritime and oil traffic.	

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